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Anatomy of an Aggregate Settlement:
The Triumph of Temptation over Ethics
Lester Brickman*
ABSTRACT

This Essay explores the ethical issues that arise for plaintiffs' lawyers involved in nonclass aggregate settlements. Rule l.B(g) of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct requires that each client in an aggregate settlement must give their informed consent to the settlement amount allocated to
them by their lawyer. This Essay argues that lawyers' fees in some aggregate
settlements are of such a magnitude that they simply overwhelm any proclivity
of lawyers to adhere to the rule. The Essay uses the Phillips Petroleum litigation as an example of the more egregious results of perverse incentives created
by fees of that magnitude.

We know little about nonclass aggregate settlements, and what
little we do know is unsettling. The American Law Institute's
("ALI") proposal in the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
to amend ABA Model Rule l.8(g) 1 to allow use of advance waiversaccommodating lawyers' interests-has provoked intense debate, but
sheds little light on lawyers' actual practices.2 We do not know, even
*

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
1 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDU= R. l.8(g) (2008).
2 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AGGREGATE L1TIG. § 3.17 (2010). The ALI states that the
"purpose of modifying the strict requirements of the aggregate-settlement rule is to facilitate
large-scale settlements that may have been impeded by the mechanical application of the aggregate-settlement rule to a substantial multiparty settlement." Id.§ 3.17 cmt. (c)(l). The principal
beneficiaries of this change will be lawyers specializing in mass torts. The ALI is often accommodative of lawyers' interests. Consider the ALi's position on whether a party to an agreement
which is unenforceable on public policy grounds can nonetheless obtain restitution or quantum
meruit. The ALI is of two minds. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that, for an
agreement to be unenforceable on public policy grounds, the interests in enforcing the agreement must be "clearly outweighed" by a public policy against enforcement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRA=s § 178(1) (1981 ); see also Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements that
Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REv. 287, 292 (2009). It goes on to articulate the relevant
factors that need to be balanced in reaching a conclusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRA=s § 178(2) (1981). If a contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds, the general rule
is that there can be no quantum meruit recovery by one who has rendered performance. See
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JosEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRA=s 833 (4th ed. 1998). The
Restatement takes the position that restitution should be the exception, rather than the norm,
under these circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRA=s § 197 (1981). The position adopted by the ALI in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is contrary.
Here, the rule adopted is that if a fee agreement between a lawyer and client is unenforceable,
the lawyer is nonetheless entitled to the fair value of her services unless the lawyer has engaged
February 2011
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approximately, how many nonclass aggregate settlements take place
annually, the number of clients represented, the amounts paid by defendants, the fees that are charged, whether clients are provided with
the requisite information so that their consent is informed, and what
methods lawyers use to allocate the settlements among the clients
(such as a matrix based on injury severity and type, age, residence,
etc.). In my experience, there is often a reason for the lack of information about certain lawyers' practices. The less that is known about
a practice, the less it is scrutinized, and that suits the practitioners just
fine.
Most of what little we do know is due to allegations of serious
lawyer misconduct in administering nonclass aggregate settlements.
My fellow panelist, Howard Erichson, has provided a detailed description of six such aggregate settlements for us to consider, five of which
involve alleged lawyer malfeasance. 3 A key question is whether these
five are aberrations or whether they are merely the tip of an iceberg,
at the base of which, below our visibility line, lies lawyer malfeasance
on a grand scale.
According to Erichson, the principal culprit accounting for lawyer
malfeasance in this area is the all-or-nothing settlement.4 This is
where a lawyer files individual claims on behalf of a large number of
clients who all claim to have been similarly injured by a single defendant and the defendant agrees to pay a single and often substantial
in a "clear and serious violation of duty to a client." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS §§ 37, 39 (2000). Professor Joseph Perillo characterizes this position as "lawyer-friendly." Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyer's Contracts ls Different, 67 FORDHAM L.
REv. 443, 447 (1998). Thus, even when a lawyer engages in a "clear and serious violation of a
duty to the client," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GovERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000), the
lawyer may still collect a fee, a privilege that Professor Perillo points out is not extended to
"(o)ther fiduciaries." Perillo, supra, at 447-48; see also Long, supra, at 296-97. Professor Alex
B. Long points out another way in which the ALi's position is lawyer-friendly. In deciding
whether to enforce a contract or to permit restitution if a provision in the contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts directs courts to take the
public interest into account. See Long, supra, at 297. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers largely ignores the public interest and focuses almost exclusively on the parties
to the contract-the lawyer and the client. See id. at 298. By turning a blind eye to issues that
transcend those of the attorney and client, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers makes it more difficult to justify any fee forfeiture by the lawyer. Id. at 299.
3 See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L.
REv. 979 (2010). The five cases that involve alleged lawyer malfeasance are the Kentucky fenphen settlement, the Napoli fen-phen settlement, the Locks fen-phen settlement, the Leeds
Morelli settlements, and the Phillips chemical plant explosion settlement.
4 See id. at 980 ("All-or-nothing settlements, however, cause a lot of mischief."); see also
id. at 983 ("All-or-nothing settlements systematically and predictably create opportunities for
abuse.").
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sum (as opposed to individual amounts for each client which are then
totaled up) to settle the claims, provided all of the lawyer's clients sign
releases. Erichson lists a litany of ills resulting from the all-or-nothing
settlement, including creating and exacerbating conflicts of interest,
creating incentives to misallocate funds, the risk of strategic holdouts,
and making slush funds in anticipation of the need to buy off the holdouts. This type of settlement also creates incentives for lawyers to
misrepresent the nature of the settlement in order to gain clients' consent and to collude with the defendant to secure that consent. 5
Erichson's solution is to avoid all-or-nothing settlements in order
to neutralize the holdout risk and its attendant evils and instead to
enter into most-or-nothing settlements, that is, settlements in which
only eighty-five to ninety-five percent of the clients are required to
sign releases in order for the settlement to go into effect. 6 He argues
that these should be acceptable to most defendants, raise far fewer
ethical concerns, and minimize the holdout risk and the ethically dubious conduct that it generates. 7
Erichson's argument strikes me as on target with one notable exception. He states that most-or-nothing settlements do not "present
as strong a risk of collusion or disloyalty" as do all-or-nothing settlements.8 I dissent. I contend that the risk of collusion between counsel
and the defendant is not a function of the all-or-nothing settlement,
but rather the lucrative nature of this area of practice, which is, in
part, a result of the lack of enforcement of ethics rules that purport to
limit lawyers' fees to "reasonable" amounts. 9 Put plainly, my thesisas expressed in a previous article-is that when "money talks, ethics
walks." 10
We are all familiar with the power of money to influence national
policymaking. In recent months, we have seen an awesome display of
that power in the halls of Congress with reference to fashioning solutions to healthcare issues and regulation of financial markets. Money
exerts a similar influence on the application of ethical principles to
lucrative litigations.
5

See id. at 1006--07; see also

PR~CIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG.

§ 3.17 cmt. b

(2010).
6

See Erichson, supra note 3, at 1023.

7
8

See id. at 1024.
Id.

9

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. l.5(a) (2008).

Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65
FORDHAM L. REV . 247 (1996).
10
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This point was driven home for me a few years ago when I led an
effort to obtain an ethics opinion from the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility regarding the increasing practice of
plaintiffs' lawyers negotiating their fees directly with defendants. 11
Consider an example cited in the letter to the ABA Committee that
goes to the heart of the issue:
An attorney comes to her client and indicates that she has
received a settlement offer in the amount of $100,000. Having hoped for a higher recovery, the client expresses his disappointment, especially considering that his net recovery
after the contingency fee will be two-thirds of that amount.
The attorney tells the client that he should not be concerned
with the fee because she and the defendant's insurance company have privately negotiated an agreement establishing the
size and mode of payment of her fee, so that the client will
not have to pay any fee at all. "It's all been taken care of by
me and the defendant," the attorney tells her client.
"There's nothing for you to worry about." Clearly, the client
in such a scenario does have something to worry about, and
will and should be less confident in his attorney's loyalty to
him. 12

The letter went on to state that cases in which the plaintiff's attorney negotiates his fee directly with the defendant
are occurring with increasing frequency and upon a dramatically increasing scale, with the legal stakes often totaling millions and even billions of dollars. The problem is amplified
in the class action context where the class is even more dependent on the judgment of the attorney when it comes to
accepting the terms of a settlement.13
The ethical issues raised by the potential self-dealing described in
the letter to the ABA Committee are accentuated by the inclusion of
provisions in class actions and other large-scale settlement agreements
designed to bulletproof the fee agreements from both judicial and client scrutiny. For example, in the tobacco litigations brought by state
attorneys general in partnership, with private attorneys hired on a
11 See Letter from Richard Abel, Michael J. Connell Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA
Sch. of Law, et al., to Stephen C. Krane, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof! Responsibility, Am. Bar Ass'n (Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ABA Letter], available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/brickman-436/ABA %20Ethics%20Letter%20
September%2017%202007%20Edited(1).pdf.
12 Id. at 4- 5.
13 Id. at 5.
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contingency fee basis-functionally, an aggregative litigation-the
monies that the states were to receive under the settlement agreements were contingent upon the ratification of the agreement negotiated by the contingency fee lawyers directly with the tobacco
companies. 14 This device enabled the private lawyers effectively to insulate their multimillion- and billion-dollar fees from any ethical inquiry into their reasonableness. When, in a few cases, the fees were
contested, state attorneys general successfully urged the rejection of
even an inquiry because that would jeopardize the flow of settlement
monies to the state.15 In class action litigation, class counsel have increasingly negotiated fee agreements with defendants that provide
that, in the event the fee is reduced by a court, that amount is credited
to the defendant and not to class members. This has increased courts'
propensities to ratify such fee agreements without serious consideration because any reduction would not benefit the class. 16
Given these practices, the signatories to the letter17 urged the
ABA Committee to declare that it is per se unethical for plaintiffs'
attorneys to agree to any provision in agreements settling large-scale
and aggregative litigations that in any way compromises the right of
the clients or classes to recover fees deemed excessive or unethical by
such review.
What was the ABA Committee's response? Well, they ducked
the request, stating that those ethical issues should be left up to the
14 See W. Kip Viscusi, Tobacco: Regulation and Taxation Through Litigation, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 22, 23, 42 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Tobacco: The Moral Issues, AMERICA, Aug. 15, 1998, at 7, 9.
15 See, e.g., State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 763 N.Y.S.2d 32, 41-42 (App. Div. 2003) (vacating
trial court's order enjoining the payment of attorney's fees); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Judge
Questions Legal Fees in New York Tobacco Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at Cl.
16 In the vast majority of cases, federal judges ultimately award class counsel about ninety
percent of what they request as fees. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Michael Perino, A New Look at Judicial Impact: Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Action After Goldberger
v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 29 WAsH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 5, 22 (2009).
17 Richard Abel, UCLA School of Law; David Barnhizer, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law; Lester Brickman, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Robert Cochran, Pepperdine University School of Law; Roger Cramton, Cornell University Law School; Leonard Gross, Southern Illinois University School of Law; Allison Hayward, George Mason University School of
Law; Michael Horowitz, Hudson Institute; Michael Krauss, George Mason University School of
Law; Lisa G. Lerman, The Catholic University of America; Judith Maute, The University of
Oklahoma College of Law; Tom Morgan, The George Washington University Law School; Jeffrey O'Connell, University of Virginia School of Law; Deborah Rhode, Stanford Law School;
Howard Rosenberg, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Ronald Rotunda, George Mason University School of Law; George Schatzki, Arizona State University College of Law; Peter
H. Schuck, Yale Law School; William Simon, Columbia Law School; and Bradley Wendel, Cornell University Law School. See ABA Letter, supra note 11, at 30.
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courts 18-the very institution that has often relegated ethical enforcement to an afterthought.
Another example of how rules of ethics are mown down by the
power of money is the hiring of screening companies by plaintiffs' lawyers to generate hundreds of thousands of claimants in the asbestos,
silica, fen-phen, silicone breast implant, and welding fume mass tort
litigations. 19 These litigation screenings have no intended health benefit; they are conducted solely to obtain mass numbers of litigants and
to generate mostly bogus medical records to support the claims. 20 The
first order of business when a potential litigant attends a litigation
screening is to sign a retainer agreement with the law firm sponsoring
the screening. 21 I estimate that approximately 1.5 million potential litigants have participated in these litigation screenings;22 that a comparative handful of litigation doctors have found that approximately 1
million of those screened had the requisite condition to confer a right
of compensation;23 that approximately 900,000 of these claims were
based on medical reports that were, in the words of Judge Janis Jack,
"manufactured for money"; 24 that the settlement value of these claims
is in the range of $35 to $40 billion;25 that the contingency fees generated are in the range of $13 to $14 billion;26 and finally, that the litigation doctors, sonographers, X-ray, and other medical technicians, etc.,
who produced the medical records for the screened litigants have
been paid well in excess of $250 million by the law firms and screening
companies that hired them. 27 If that does not violate the Model Rule
prohibiting lawyers from compensating or giving anything of value to
a person who has recommended their services or soliciting employment from a client,28 then nothing does.
It is not an overstatement to conclude that if a provision were
added to the rules of professional conduct promulgated by state supreme courts that the rules would not apply to mass tort litigations,
18 See Letter from Steven C. Krane, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof! Responsibility, Am. Bar Ass'n, to author (Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with author).
19 See generally Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screening in Mass Torts: A
Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REv. 1221 (2008).
20 See id. at 1226.
2 1 See id. at 1227.
22 See id. at 1313.
23 See id. at 1228.
24 See id. at 1313.
25 See id.
26 See id.
21 See id.
28 See Mo DEL R ULES OF PRoF'L Co NDUCT R. 7.2(b), 7.3(a) (2008).
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then actual practices in such litigations would remain unchanged. The
Rules already are largely ignored by courts and by disciplinary agencies-with one notable exception. Ironically, that one exception is
Rule l.8(g), which the ALI now seeks to effectively amend.
Rule 1.8(g) applies to aggregate settlements.29 In these nonclass
aggregate litigations, lawyers solicit or otherwise obtain hundreds and
even thousands of clients who have similar claims against a single defendant, and typically charge contingency fees ranging from one-third
to forty percent. Indeed, forty percent appears to have become the
standard contingency fee in nonclass mass tort litigation. 30 While the
use of the class action device in certain mass torts has been circumscribed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor31 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation, 32 another reason for
bringing nonclass mass tort actions is that lawyers can charge fifty to
one hundred percent higher fees than what they would be awarded in
a class action. It strikes me as mind-boggling that commentators on
nonclass mass tort litigations largely, if not entirely, ignore the fact
that mass tort lawyers are charging contingency fees that even exceed
the fees that lawyers charge in "retail" personal injury litigation-fees
which are already excessive in many cases. 33 United States District
Court Judge Jack Weinstein, in a mass consolidation of thousands of
individual actions against the manufacturer of the antidepressant
Zyprexa, was critical of the failure of the lawyers to adjust their fees
to reflect the huge economies of scale realized by the lawyers and
slightly reduced the lawyers' forty-percent fees. 34 Judge Weinstein
reasoned that in mass torts, there is a special concern about excessive
fees, which "can create a sense of overcompensation and reflect
poorly on the court and its bar" and that " [p]ublic understanding of
the fairness of the judicial process in handling mass torts ... is a signifSee id. R. 1.8(g).
See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES R EALLY
COST AMERICA 58, 60 (2011).
31 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1996).
32 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1998).
33 For a discussion of contingency fees in ordinary tort litigation, see Lester Brickman, The
Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L.
REv. 65 (2003).
34 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge
Weinstein's action incurred the wrath of Professors Charles Silver and Geoffrey P. Miller. See
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District
Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 V AND. L. REv . 107, 110, 136-38 (2010). For my critique
of the Silver-Miller argument, see BRICKMAN, supra note 30 (manuscript at 58-60) (on file with
author).
29

30
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icant aspect of complex national litigations involving thousands of parties."35 A unique provision in the New Jersey state court rules
purports to take economies of scale into account and significantly
limit lawyers' fees in nonclass aggregate litigations. 36 Lawyers need
not worry, however; there is no evidence that this provision is ever
complied with or that any steps have been taken to enforce it.
Given the absence of any enforcement of reasonable fee provisions in states' ethics codes, lawyers are free to (and do) realize windfall fees of millions and even tens of millions of dollars in nonclass
aggregate litigations. 37
Fees of this magnitude pose temptations that simply overwhelm
any proclivity to adhere to ethics rules, and especially to the requirements set forth in Rule l.8(g). This risk is magnified exponentially
when a lawyer sets out from the start to: (1) identify a defendant
against whom colorable claims could be asserted, such as claims that
an employer violated employment laws with regard to overtime or
employment discrimination; (2) actively solicit employees of the defendant-to-be to join in the litigation; (3) obtain a sufficient number of
clients to command the attention of the employer; (4) file the claims
and then enter into settlement negotiations with the employer;
(5) structure an aggregate settlement whereby the employer will pay
In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94.
The rules provide:
When representation is undertaken on behalf of several persons whose respective
claims . .. involve substantially identical liability issues, the contingent fee shall be
calculated on the basis of the aggregate sum of all recoveries . . . and shall be
charged to the clients in proportion to the recovery of each.
N.J. CIV. PRAc . R. 1:21-7(i). Substantial savings to clients would result if, as the New Jersey rule
provides, contingency fees were applied on the aggregate amount in mass settlements such as
those that have frequently taken place in asbestos litigation. For example, if an attorney for 200
plaintiffs reached a settlement with 5 defendants that provided for an aggregate payment of $48
million (and it is allocated evenly among the clients so that each gets $240,000)-and the facts
alleged would fall under the ambit of Rule 1:21-7(i), but the rule is ignored-then under New
Jersey Civil Practice Rule 1:21-7(c)-which limits contingency fees in tort cases to 33 11.io/o on the
first $500,000, 30% on the next $500,000, 25% on the next $500,000, and 20% on any amounts in
excess of $1.5 million-the total contingency fee would be $16 million. See id. R. l :21-7(c).
However, if the fees are calculated pursuant to Rule 1:21-7(i), which would take into account the
aggregate nature of the mass settlement, the total fee would be $9,741,667-39% less. Higher
settlements involving larger numbers of clients will widen the spread between the Rule 1:21-7(c)
fee and the Rule 1:21-7(i) fee. For example, if the number of clients in the settlement were 1000
and each received $480,000, then the yield difference between the two fee calculations would
approximate 40% .
37 In the Phillips Petroleum aggregate settlement, contingency fees amounted to approximately $65 million. See infra text accompanying note 59. In the Nextel aggregate settlement, the
fees totaled $5.5 million. See William H. Simon, The· Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic
Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1555, 1580 (2008).
35
36
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either a set sum to be divided up by the lawyer among the clients or
pay whatever sums are determined by an arbitration process; and
(6) receive a contingency fee adding up to a substantial sum or agree
to a substantial fee to be paid by the employer directly to the lawyer
based upon the number of clients that accept the settlement. The
. Florida Supreme Court said that by use of the latter provision, the
lawyer "became an agent for [the defendant] while still representing
his . . . clients against [the defendant]." 38 This modus operandi
roughly equates with that of the firm of Leeds, Morelli & Brown PC,
described by William Simon in one of the most pathbreaking and courageous statements of conscience to ever appear in a law review. 39
The cure for this problem is not to be found in tinkering with the
universality of the settlement. The problem is avarice, and the solution-if there is one-is not structural, but rather the threat of sanctions not limited to loss of some or all of the fee and including a
disciplinary component as well. While a handful of lawyers have been
severely sanctioned for violating Rule 1.S(g),40 disciplinary agencies
would appear to have a strong aversion to enforcing Rule 1.8(g) absent very compelling circumstances, such as highly visible criminal
conduct. 41
One possible solution to curb lawyers' failures to adhere to the
requirements of Rule 1.8(g) is to require that lawyers submit all aggregate settlements for approval by a designated judicial official in the
jurisdiction where the lawyer practices or where the calamity occurred. 42 Alas, this proposal is unlikely to cure the problem of lawyers' failures to adhere to Rule 1.8(g). Even were such a requirement
Fla. Bar v. Rodriguez, 959 So. 2d 150, 160 (Fla. 2007).
See Simon, supra note 37, at 1576-86.
40 For descriptions of sanctions against lawyers for violating Rule 1.8(g), see Katherine
Dirks, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of Mass Torts: A Proposal to Revise Rule l.B(g) ,
83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 501, 515-16 (2008), and Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven D. Maloney, Justice Is
Hard, Let's Go Shopping! Trading Justice for Efficiency Under the New Aggregate Settlement
Regime, 83 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 521, 561 (2009).
41 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 3, at 983-89 (describing the Kentucky fen-phen settlement and the criminal convictions that were obtained).
42 The ALI proposal allows for limited judicial review of nonclass aggregate settlements
when one of the clients seeks such review. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AooREOATE Lrno.
§ 3.18 (2010). A possible model for such a requirement is the New York Appellate Division rule
requiring that lawyers file a copy of their contingency fee retainer agreements in personal injury
and wrongful death cases with the state Office of Court Administration. See N.Y. CoMP. CooEs
R. & Rsos. tit. 22, § 691.20(a)(l) (2011). Attorneys are also required to file a closing statement
indicating the disposition of the claim, the gross amount received, the disbursements made, and
the fee charged. Id. § 691.20(b). There is no indication, however, that the Office of Court Administration reviews the forms filed.
38
39
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adopted, we can anticipate that some lawyers would fail to file their
settlements with a court, maintaining that they had not entered into
an aggregate settlement even when they had done so. For example, in
the Phillips Petroleum and fen-phen aggregate settlements, the plaintiffs' lawyers maintained that they had not entered into aggregate settlements even though the clear weight of the evidence was that they
had. 43 Even when lawyers acknowledge that they have entered into
an aggregate settlement, they may nonetheless claim that they made
the necessary disclosures though their clients maintain that no such
disclosures were made. 44
In this brief Essay, I advance the view that lawyer adherence to
ethical rules appears to be inversely related to the financial stakes for
the lawyer. The aggregate settlement in the Phillips Petroleum explosion-which I next explore-shows how the financial incentives, in
the form of a $65 million fee, drove the lawyers to abandon adherence
to the requirements of Rule l.8(g). It appears unlikely that the situation would have unfolded any differently had the settlement in Phillips Petroleum provided that only ninety percent of the firm's clients
would have to agree for the settlement to be effective.
THE AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT IN THE
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM EXPLOSION

On October 23, 1989, an explosion at the Phillips Petroleum
Company's Houston plant killed twenty-three people and injured
43 See In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig., No. 700000/98, 2007 WL 969426, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 27, 2007) (discussing the fen-phen litigation); Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 (discussing the
Phillips Petroleum case). In a proceeding before New York Supreme Court Judge Charles Ramos, the issue whether the Jaw firm of Napoli Kaiser & Bern ("Napoli firm") entered into an
aggregate settlement with Wyeth of 5000 claims for a reported $1 billion and whether it conformed to New York Disciplinary Rule 5-106, see N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 1200.25 (2011), with regard to notifying its clients that there was an aggregate settlement and
getting their informed consent, was determined. See In re N. Y. Diet Drug Litig., 2007 WL
%9426, at *3-4. Though the Napoli firm maintained that it did not enter into an aggregate
settlement and produced a legal ethics expert to support its position, Judge Ramos found that
"[i]t is clearly a Jump sum collective or aggregate settlement." Id. at *4. Also under review was
an allegation by the law firm of Parker & Waichman LLP, that when the Napoli firm allocated
the settlement proceeds among its 5000 clients, it allocated disproportionately larger amounts to
its own clients and lesser amounts to the clients referred to the firm by Parker & Waichman, so
that the Napoli firm could capture contingency fees at the expense of Parker & Waichman. See
Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 815 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73-74 (App. Div. 2006), recalling and vacating
806 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2005); see also Anthony DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer Made Name in Lawsuit on Diet Pills, N.Y. T1MES, Mar. 30, 2008, at A23. This discussion draws substantially from a
prior article, Brickman, supra note 19, at 1265 n.198.
44 See Simon, supra note 37, at 1590 (referring to the Nextel settlement).
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hundreds. 45 Phillips Petroleum was determined by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") to have operated the
plant in violation of OSHA safety standards and was fined. 46 Thus,
there was not only no issue with regard to Phillips' liability for the
explosion, but punitive damages were a distinct possibility. 47 Indeed,
one of the lead lawyers representing the victims testified that in his
"thirty years-plus of practice [he] never had as good a set of liability
facts to work with. " 48 Phillips settled virtually all of the resulting
claims for an amount said to exceed $400 million. 49 Despite the payout, Phillips was able to realize a net profit of $256 million from the
explosion because of its casualty, property, and business interruption
insurance. 50 Most of the claimants came to be individually represented by three of the major plaintiffs' firms in Texas. 51 One was the
firm of Umphrey, Burrow, Reaud, Williams & Bailey ("Umphrey
Burrow")-which was formed in 1988 by some of the leading Texas
law firms to handle asbestos suits in the refinery-rich Houston ship
channel area. 52 The families of 126 Phillips employees-the lion's
share of those with claims-were solicited by or directed to Umphrey
Burrow by officials of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union,
whose own lawyer was David Burrow. 53
See Passell, supra note 43.
See Phillips 66 Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1332 (No. 90-1549, 1993).
47 There was a possibility that compensation would be paid under the Texas workers' compensation statutes. See TEx. LAB. CODE ANN.§§ 401-408 (West 2009). This would have materially reduced the amounts paid to the Phillips employees who were injured by the explosion but
would also have reduced the risk born by the lawyers from negligible to nonexistent. As it
turned out, given Phillips' egregious conduct, compensation was determined through the tort
system. See Passell, supra note 43.
48 Deposition of David Burrow at 189-90, Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-049658 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 5, 1995), 1995 WL 17856378.
49 See Passell, supra note 43.
50 Deposition of Cecil Jesse Silas at 280-81, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378.
51 See Passell, supra note 43.
52 Brenda Sapino, 'Super-Firm ' Partners Profit Feud Nears Trial, TEX. LAW., May 2, 1994,
at 1. At the time of the firm's formation, tens of thousands of mostly bogus asbestos claims were
being filed in Texas courts by lawyers, mostly charging forty-percent contingency fees. See Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between
Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 33, 36, 64 (2003). For in-depth discussion of the issues
of false claims that arise in such cases, see generally id.; Lester Brickman, Disparities Between
Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Litigation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 513 (2007).
53 See Passell, supra note 43. (David Burrow is the "Burrow" in Umphrey Burrow.) Two
days after the explosion, several Umphrey Burrow lawyers came to the union hall to sign up
clients. See L.M. Sixel, Victims of Phillips Blast Assail Settlements, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 23, 1992,
at lE. Other clients said they signed up with the firm after they were visited at home by a lawyer
or after they were solicited by union shop stewards. Id.
45

46
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Umphrey Burrow lawyers had little or no contact with their clients for almost a year. The litigation was largely in abeyance while a
federal investigation ensued, though settlement negotiations were taking place. 54 In February 1991, Umphrey Burrow's clients were summoned to the firm's office to be told that Phillips had offered to settle
each of the cases for sums ranging from $25,000 to $9.5 million. 55
Though the firm had initially demanded $271,605,000, apparently on
the basis of adding up individual claims,56 a $190 million settlement
was reached between Umphrey Burrow and Phillips after protracted
negotiations. 57 In exchange, Umphrey Burrow agreed not to litigate
on behalf of any of its clients. The amount of the settlement was not
arrived at by toting up individual settlements for each client, but
rather was a lump sum, dictated by insurance availability, which the
firm was to divide up as it saw fit. 58 The individual fee agreements
between the firm and its clients provided for contingency fees of either one-third or forty percent, amounting to approximately $65 million. 59 The trick, then, was to convince the 126 clients to accept the
amounts that the firm had allocated to them. Over a ten-day period,
starting February 22, 1991, the 126 clients were called to the firm's
office to be told the terms of the settlement in individual meetings
with one of three lawyers, scheduled to last twenty minutes each. 60
54 Shortly after the explosion, the firm obtained an injunction that forced the company to
allow union investigators onto the site. See Sixel, supra note 53.
55 See Passell, supra note 43.
56 See Letter from David H. Burrow, Attorney, Umphrey, Burrow, Reaud, Williams &
Baily, to Otway Denny, Attorney, Fulbright & Jaworski (Dec. 17, 1990) (on file with author).
57 See Passell, supra note 43.
58 See id.
59 See id. At least one of the clients stated that, though the retainer agreement she signed
provided for a one-third contingency fee, the lawyer promised her that her fee would be reduced
to between 20 and 25% if more clients signed up. Her fee was not reduced. See Interview with
Julane Campbell in Hous., Tex. (Mar. 2, 1995). Another client asserted that he thought he
signed a retainer agreement providing for a one-third fee but that he was charged a 40% fee. See
Affidavit of Gary McPherson 'I 6, Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-049658 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 5, 1995),
1995 WL 17856378 (on file with author). Still another client stated that, though he signed a
blank fee contract, he was told the fee would be 25% of the recovery; he was charged 33 16%.
Affidavit of Stephen Bryant '1 6, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (Jan. 24, 1995) (on file
with author) . My rough, back-of-the-envelope calculation is that, based on a $65 million fee and
payment of $17 million in referral fees, the Umphrey Burrow lawyers' effective hourly rate was
approximately $20,000.
60 See Passell, supra note 43. These meetings were quite perfunctory, and at least one
client never actually met his attorney, Mr. Burrow. See Letter from Calvin Williams to Robert
Nelson, Senior Investigator, State Bar of Tex. (on file with author) (claiming that Burrow did not
handle his case as an individual case, and that he never actually met Burrow or spoke to him
before signing a settlement agreement).
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The lawyers told them that the amount had been the subject of individual negotiations with Phillips; that it was the best offer they would
get; that it was based on a review of their medical records, which had
been obtained and evaluated; and requested that they sign the release
form. In fact, the statements that the amounts were fixed in the
course of negotiations with Phillips and were based on a review of
their medical records were false. Not only was there an aggregate settlement, but few of the clients' medical records had been accessed
when these meetings took place. 61 Twenty-five of the clients who objected were offered larger sums.62 These added amounts were "paid"
for by reducing the amounts allocated to fifteen others. 63 Those clients who objected were told that if they did not sign, the firm would
not pursue their case in court and that if they hired other counsel,
both firms would each be entitled to one-third of their recovery, leaving them with only one-third. 64 Those who still remained recalcitrant
were brought before Texas District Court Judge Alice Oliver-Parrot,
who told them that the settlement was fair and that if they turned it
down, they would likely not fare as well. 65 Before going on the bench
61 See Affidavit of Roberta M. Edwards 'l'I 4-7, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378
(Jan. 17, 1995) (on file with author); Sixel, supra note 53.
62 See Final Settlements Chart, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (on file with
author).
63 See id. One client stated that he rejected the $36,000 that the firm offered and that it
was then raised to $125,000. He stated that he was told by Ken Bailey that they took the money
from someone else. Affidavit of Gary McPherson at 4, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378
(on file with author). In a similar situation, another client had his offer raised from $375,000 to
$475,000. See Letter from Silverrol Ferguson to State Bar of Texas (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file with
author). A total of twenty-five clients had their final amounts increased by a total of $1 ,740,000,
and fifteen clients had their amounts decreased by $1,155,000. See Injury Claims-Summary of
Demands and Offers, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (on file with author).
64 See Letter from Calvin Williams to Robert Nelson, supra note 60 (claiming that he was
told that his offer "was a good offer and that I could not get any more and could not go to court"
and that "he made me think that I had no other choice"); see also Brief of Appellants at 12-13,
Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (No. 14-95-00360-CV) (collecting client
recollections regarding alleged ploys used by the attorneys to secure the clients' agreements to
the settlement, including being told that this was the best offer they would get; that trial would
result in a smaller or no recovery; that if they were to use another attorney, the defendants
would still take one-third in addition to what they would have to pay the second attorney; and
that, in one case, salacious information about one.client's family would be introduced if the case
went to trial).
65 See Passell, supra note 43. Judge Oliver-Parrot's involvement in the case began when
she was assigned as the trial judge in the case of Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 89-46055
(151st Dist. Ct., Harris Cnty., Tex. 1991) (on file with author). At the time that Judge OliverParrot was the district court judge assigned to the Bogle case, her name was Alice Oliver
Trevathan, and she was known as Alice Trevathan. All references to her in this Essay, however,
identify her as Alice Oliver-Parrot-a name which she assumed subsequently. See Sixel, supra
note 53. Judge Oliver-Parrot appointed Theodore Goller, for whom she had previously worked
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in 1986, Judge Oliver-Parrot had joined the firm of Gibbons, Burrow
& Bratton ("GBB") in 1981.66 During the time when Umphrey Burrow was bringing clients before her, she was receiving payments from
the GBB law firm for her share of past work. 67
The firm's efforts largely succeeded, and all but a handful agreed
to settle for a total of $190 million. 68 The settlement, however, would
at the law firm that was representing Phillips, to act as guardian ad !item for roughly 160 minor
children of those who had suffered personal injury. See id. She then presided over hearings
approving all of the settlements on behalf of the children. Those claims were all settled for $500
for each of the children, with the money taken out of their parents' settlement amounts. See id.
These settlements were sought by Phillips in order to terminate whatever claims the children had
against Phillips. See id. Goller's investigation of the claims of these 160 children, which began
on February 21, 1991, and ended on February 25, 1991, consisted of reviewing the medical
records of five clients. Mr. Goller never spoke with the children, their parents, family or friends,
or any counselors or healthcare providers. See id. For this work, Judge Oliver-Parrot approved
payment to Goller of $60,000. See Check to Theodore Goller, Bogle, No. 89-46055 (on file with
author). During the minors' hearings, Umphrey Burrow lawyers asked her to talk with other
clients who did not have children. See Deposition of Alice Oliver-Parrot at 67, Arce, No. 9204%58, 1995 WL 17856378. She agreed, in response to the lawyers' requests for her assistance in
closing the settlements, because "[she] liked all the lawyers in the case, so they knew [she'd] help
them out" by having hearings on weekends and at night in order to accommodate their clients'
work schedules. Id. at 66. She denies that she had been asked to convince the clients that they
should accept the applicable settlement amounts that had been agreed to, but to "Li]ust tell them
what the deal is. What's the settlement? What ... are we doing here?" Id. at 67. She stated
that she advised them that since they hired their lawyers for their expertise, they should listen to
their advice and that if they went to trial "you can get zero or you can get more. It's a gamble."
Id. at 72. The judge insisted that "I never told anybody to settle their case. I told them, 'You do
what you think is right, but listen to the lawyers, that's why you hire them."' Id. at 73. At one of
the settlement hearings, a client testified that Ken Bailey had said that "[y]ou may get to
meet .. . [Judge Oliver-Parrot] because she's going to have you down there to chew you out" if
you refuse the settlement. Settlement Hearing at 10, Bogle, No. 89-46055 (on file with author).
At that hearing, Judge Oliver-Parrot stated to that recalcitrant client: "Look, I'm telling you
from the gut I'm afraid you're going to get nothing and then you will really think the system is
horrible." Id. at 11.
66

Deposition of Alice Oliver-Parrot at 6-7, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378.

See id. at 10. In her deposition, Judge Oliver-Parrot was asked about the amount of
these payments. She replied that she could not recall and that she had not maintained any
records of the payments because of concerns of "confidentiality." Id. at 9-11. Though David
Burrow was subpoenaed to supply copies of the checks, none were ever produced. See Deposition of David Burrow at 6-7, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378. One of the reasons that
Umphrey Burrow was anxious to conclude a settlement with Phillips' insurance carrier was the
concern that Judge Oliver-Parrot would be elevated to a higher court and would therefore "not
be around" "to assist" the firm in "successfully convincing ... clients that they should take the
applicable settlement amounts." Letter from Kenneth Bailey, Jr., to Blake Tartt and Otway
Denny (Feb. 14, 1991) (on file with author). Two months after the settlement, Judge OliverParrot was appointed Chief Justice of Texas's First Court of Appeals. See Passell, supra note 43.
Her deposition took place after this appointment. In 1994, she ran for the Texas Supreme Court
and lost. See id. Umphrey Burrow contributed $80,000 to her campaign. See id.
67

68

See Passell, supra note 43.
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come to have an afterlife. Silverrol Ferguson, a thirty-nine-year-old
mechanic at the plant, who had settled his claim for $500,000, had
been angered by the firm's tactics and complained to the Texas Bar
Association that the firm had done shoddy work, including failing to
even obtain his medical records before the settlement showing the
medical care he received after the explosion. 69 The Texas Bar Association determined that Mr. Burrow had not committed an ethical
breach. 7° Ferguson then attempted to hire a lawyer to attack the settlement. No Texas lawyer, however, would take his case. 71
Ultimately, Ferguson hired William Skepnek,72 a Lawrence, Kansas, trial lawyer, who, in 1992, brought a malpractice action against
Umphrey Burrow on behalf of forty-six of the firm's clients. 73 The
complaint alleged a conflict of interest stemming from a "secret
'agreement'" between the plaintiffs' lawyers and the defendant and its
law firm, the existence of an aggregate settlement, and the failure to
inform clients and obtain their informed consent to the aggregate settlement.74 Skepnek moved for pro hac vice status.75 A year and a half
later, days before the trial, Judge Mark Davidson turned down his request, delaying the trial.7 6 Skepnek then took the MPRE exam and
successfully petitioned for admission to the Texas bar on grounds of
69 See Letter from Silverrol Ferguson to the State Bar of Texas (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file
with author).
10 Letter from the State Bar of Texas to Silverrol Ferguson (Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with
author) (stating that Burrow did not commit professional misconduct as defined by the Texas
Code of Professional Responsibility); see also Letter from David H. Burrow to Robert E. Nelson, Senior Investigator, State Bar of Texas (Sept. 9, 1991) (on file with author) (responding to
Ferguson's letter to the State Bar of Texas claiming that Burrow's office had treated Ferguson
fairly and that the net settlement "was not only very fair, but extremely generous").
71 Peter Passell, Plaintiffs Win Right to Sue Lawyers in Malpractice Case, N .Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1997, at A28.
72 Skepnek would later take on the Texas firm of Baron & Budd over its use of a "script
memo" to "implant false memories" in the minds of its asbestos clients resulting in the near
demise of his professional career. For a detailed account of the "script memo" and Skepnek's
courageous but probably foolhardy attempt to have the merits of the "script memo" adjudicated,
see Brickman, supra note 52, at 141-66. This account became the subject of a micturating match
between myself and Professor Charles Silver of The University of Texas School of Law. See
generally Charles Silver, A Rejoinder to Lester Brickman: On the Theory Class 's Theories of
Asbestos Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 765 (2005); Lester Brickman, A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder
to On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 781 (2005) (abstract
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=761845).
73 See Passell, supra note 43.
74 See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition, Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-049658 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 5, 1995), 1995 WL 17856378.
75 See Interview with William Skepnek in Hous., Tex. (Mar. 2, 1995).
76 See id.
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reciprocity with Kansas. 77 After resumption of the trial, Judge Davidson granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that
while there was "sufficient evidence of an aggregate settlement ... to
create a fact issue," 78 based upon the opinion of an expert witness for
the firm which was contradicted by expert testimony for the plaintiffs,
the plaintiffs could not show they had been damaged-that is, received less than the amounts they would have received had their cases
gone to trial. 79 At least some explosion victims who were represented
by other law firms obtained far more favorable settlements than did
the Umphrey Burrow clients. The one death case represented individually was settled for $40 million-four times as much as the largest
sum received by an Umphrey Burrow plaintiff. 80 Carole Griffin, an
Umphrey Burrow client who refused to accept her $150,000 offer,
later hired another lawyer who negotiated a $797,000 settlement. 81
A panel of the Texas Court of Appeals overturned Judge Davidson's dismissal. 82 Prior to oral arguments before a panel of the Texas
Court of Appeals in March 1996, attorneys Umphrey, Reaud, and
Williams reached confidential settlements in the malpractice case,
leaving only Burrow and William's partner, F. Kenneth Bailey, Jr., to
soldier on. 83
In 1999, in Burrow v. Arce,84 a shot heard around the bar, the
Texas Supreme Court held that lawyers who breach their fiduciary duties to their clients can be required to forfeit their fees even if the
clients cannot show that they have suffered any actual damages.85
See id.
Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378.
79 See id.
80 Jim Morris, Phillips Settlement Worth $40 Million, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1994, at lA.
Bl Affidavit of Carol Griffin at 2, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (Jan. 16, 1995)
(on file with author).
82 Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), affd in part, rev 'd in part, 997
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (holding that, while the plaintiffs were not entitled to actual damages, a
question existed as to whether a breach of fiduciary duty took place with regard to the alleged
failure to obtain the informed consent of their clients as mandated by the aggregate settlement
rule, that fee forfeiture is an appropriate remedy in Texas for breach of fiduciary duty, and that
plaintiffs were not required to prove actual damages, as proof of breach was sufficient).
83 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. 1999).
84 Id.
ss Id. at 238-39 (holding that fee forfeiture is the appropriate remedy when there is a
breach of fiduciary duty that does not result in actual damages because "[i]t is the agent's disloyalty, not any resulting harm, that violates the fiduciary relationship and thus impairs the basis for
compensation. An agent's compensation is not only for specific results but also for loyalty").
The court found that the purpose of the remedy of fee forfeiture is to act as a deterrent to
attorneys who may think to breach their duty of loyalty because " [t]he remedy of forfeiture
removes any incentive for an agent to stray from his duty of loyalty based on the possibility that
77
78
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Thereafter, Burrow also settled the case. All of the settlement
amounts are confidential. 86
The actions by the attorneys in this nonclass aggregate settlement
illustrate the powerful influence that a $65 million fee had on a quintet of wealthy lawyers and possibly others involved in the litigation.
Would their actions have been different if section 3.17 of the ALi's
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation had been adopted in
Texas? Perhaps. And then again, perhaps not.

the principal will be unharmed or may have difficulty proving the existence or amount of damages." Id. To require proof of damages would therefore undermine the purpose of the remedy.
See id.
86 Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-49658, 2000 WL 35633123 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000). On
November 19, 1992, Umphrey Burrow and all of its constituent attorneys filed suit against the
Arce plaintiffs, William Skepnek, and others. See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Umphrey v. Arce,
No. 92-52674 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1992). They alleged that the Arce plaintiffs had committed perjury,
violated court orders with respect to confidentiality and settlement agreements, and committed
libel and slander. See id. They also claimed that the plaintiffs' lawyers had caused defamatory
articles to appear in the Houston Chronicle and The National Law Journal, and had interfered
with the attorney-client relationship existing between the plaintiffs in this action and their clients. See id. Finally the suit alleged that the Arce plaintiffs and their lawyers had engaged in a
civil conspiracy. See id. Presumably, this suit was dismissed in the course of the various settlements with Umphrey Burrow lawyers.

